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Abstract
We axiomatize in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences, called
rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision
under uncertainty as well as state-dependent versions of these models. We prove that
aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if and only if (society’s) preferences
are uncertainty neutral. The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral
attitude toward uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that
it is not possible to aggregate multiple prior agents, even when they all have the
same set of priors. A number of ways to restore the possibility of aggregation are
then discussed.
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1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955)’s celebrated result shows that it is possible to aggregate von
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Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility maximizers: the social utility
is a convex combination of the agents’ utilities. Extending this result to more
general settings turns out to be difficult. For instance, whenever agents are ex-
pected utility maximizers but entertain different beliefs, aggregation becomes
impossible.
In this paper, we take up this issue, widening considerably the set of prefer-
ences considered, that encompasses many well-known models of decision under
uncertainty (subjective expected utility, multiple prior model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), Choquet expected utility of Schmeidler (1989) and more
generally c-linear biseparable preferences of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001),
as well as state-dependent versions of these preferences). 1 Our main result
takes the following form. Assume agents and society have preferences of this
sort on a given set of acts. 2 Assume furthermore that this set of acts is rich
enough so that a diversity condition on preferences holds. Then, aggregating
(some) agents’ preferences is possible if and only if they possess a form of
uncertainty neutrality, to be discussed momentarily, and leads to linear ag-
gregation. In particular, if an agent has some kind of non neutral attitude
towards uncertainty, then either he is a dictator (society’s preferences place a
zero weight on all other agents) or he gets a zero weight in the society’s pref-
erences. A particular case of interest is when agents conform to the multiple
prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), in which an agent evaluates an
act by taking its minimal expected utility with respect to a set of priors. Then,
a corollary of our result is that aggregation of such agents is impossible unless
they are actually expected utility agents (in which case the set of priors is a
singleton.) One crucial point behind the impossibility result is the assumption
that there exists a set of acts on which individuals are uncertainty neutral (for
instance, constant acts for the multiple prior model) which is also a set of acts
on which society is uncertainty neutral. Relaxing this assumption points to a
way of restoring aggregation.
The result complements several previous results in the literature. Hylland and
Zeckhauser (1979), Seidenfeld et al. (1989), and Mongin (1995) showed that
aggregation of subjective expected utility agents’ preferences was not possible
as soon as they have different beliefs. Mongin (1998) showed that expanding
the class of preferences to state-dependent preferences would yield a possibility
result but argued against this way of restoring the possibility of aggregating
preferences. He showed in particular that as soon as one pins down the be-
liefs of the agents then state-dependence is of no help. Chambers and Hayashi
(2006) showed that eventwise monotonicity (P3) and weak comparative prob-
ability (P4) are incompatible with the Pareto axiom. Relaxing these axioms
1 A limitation is that we adopt Anscombe and Aumann (1963) approach.
2 We follow Harsanyi’s approach by imposing the same rationality requirements on
the agents’ and the society’s preferences.
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while keeping the sure-thing principle leads to state-dependent expected utility
preferences, for which they show a possibility result in a Savage setting. Our
setting allows for state-dependence preferences from the beginning and our
impossibility theorem applies to state-dependent preferences as well. Gilboa
et al. (2004) showed in a subjective expected utility setting, that imposing the
Pareto axiom on issues for which agents are unanimous (have identical beliefs)
implies that the society’s beliefs have to be an affine combination of agents’
beliefs and, similarly, that the society’s vNM utility function has to be a linear
combination of agents’ vNM utility functions (note that this does not imply
that society’s overall utility function is a convex combination of the agents’.)
A corollary to our main result is that in the multiple prior model, aggregation
is impossible even in the case when all agents have the same set of priors.
Thus, restricting the Pareto axiom has no bite here. Finally, Blackorby et al.
(2004) showed, in a somewhat different framework (that of ex ante-ex post ag-
gregation), that aggregation was essentially impossible in the rank dependent
expected utility model.
As we mentioned, we want to allow for state dependence while at the same
time allowing for all kinds of attitudes toward uncertainty. There is no decision
model in the literature that achieves this goal. A first contribution of the
present paper is hence to develop a fairly general model of preferences under
uncertainty, allowing for state-dependence. Then, assuming agents conform
to this decision model, we show that it is impossible to aggregate agents’
preferences into a well-defined preference relation at the social level that would
also conform to this model unless agents have uncertainty neutral preferences,
where uncertainty-neutrality is defined in the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) as indifference to mixing indifferent acts.
As argued in Gilboa et al. (2004), the relevance of this literature is partly due
to the rhetoric of decision making in a democracy. Quoting these authors,
“(...) the theoretical conclusion that aggregating tastes and beliefs is im-
possible, is troubling. If there is, indeed, no way to aggregate preferences of
all individuals, then a ruling party or a president may feel exempted from
seeking to represent society in its entirety even if elected by an incidental
majority. (...) However, we argue that the impossibility results cannot be
cited as an indirect justification of ignoring minority views, because they
rely on a counterintuitive assumption. By contrast, a more intuitive version
of this assumption necessitates aggregation of preferences.” Gilboa et al.
(2004),p.935.
The counterintuitive assumption they refer to is the Pareto axiom that says
that if all individuals in society agree on preferences between two alternatives,
so should society. As we mentioned, they replace it by a weaker Pareto con-
dition that applies only when all individuals have identical beliefs or, dually,
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when they have identical tastes. A consequence of our result is to show that
their possibility result hinges on the fact that all individuals are Bayesian
expected utility maximizers. If, however, some of these individuals do not
conform to expected utility, for instance because they do not have precise
(subjective) probabilities, but rather a range of probabilities, their result no
longer holds. Indeed, the present paper shows that a wide variety of models,
allowing for some type of Knightian uncertainty, give rise to the impossibility
result even if the Pareto condition is restricted to identical “beliefs”. In this
sense, we are back to the troubling theoretical conclusion that a ruling party
or president might be entitled to act in a dictatorial way, since there is no rea-
sonable way to aggregate preferences when individuals differ both in utilities
and in beliefs.
The paper is divided into six sections and three appendices. Section 2 in-
troduces the decision theoretic setup needed, while Section 3 contains a new
representation result. The main result of the paper is in Section 4. Section 5
provides a discussion of why known arguments used in the literature to restore
the possibility of aggregation fail here, as well as some thoughts on ways to
relax some of our assumptions that would allow for some (non linear) aggrega-
tion. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains three models illustrating the
decision theoretic part developed in Sections 2 and 3. Appendix B contains
the proof of the representation result given in Section 3, while Appendix C
contains the proof of the aggregation result.
2 Setup
We consider a society made of a finite number of agents N ′ = {1, . . . , n}.
Let N = {0, 1, . . . , n} where 0 refers to society. Uncertainty is represented
by a set S and an algebra of events Σ. We adopt Anscombe and Aumann
(1963)’s framework: Let X be a non-empty set of consequences and Y be the
set of distributions over X with finite support. Let A be the set of acts, that
is, functions f : S → Y which are measurable with respect to Σ. Since Y
is a mixture space, one can define for any f, g ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], the act
αf +(1−α)g in A which yields αf(s)+(1−α)g(s) ∈ Y for every state s ∈ S.
We model the preferences of an agent i ∈ N ′ on A by a binary relation %i,
and, as customary we denote by ∼i and ≻i its symmetric and asymmetric
components. Society’s preferences are denoted %0. The first axiom is usual,
will be maintained throughout, and states that preferences are a complete,
transitive, and continuous relation.
Axiom 1 For all f, g, h ∈ A,
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(1) f % g or g % f ;
(2) if f % g and g % h then f % h;
(3) if f ≻ g and g ≻ h, then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf+(1−α)h ≻
g and g ≻ βf + (1− β)h.
We will almost exclusively be interested in the properties of preferences on
a small domain of acts on which they have some structure. We next define
the notion of regular acts from which this domain will be constructed, as the
relevant domain will consist of binary acts whose components are regular. 3
For an event E and two acts f and g, denote fEg the act giving f(s) if s ∈ E
and g(s) if not. For F ⊂ A and E ∈ Σ, let B(F , E) = {fEg |f, g ∈ F } that is,
binary acts on the event E whose components belong to a subset of acts F .
When there is no possible confusion about the reference set F , we will simply
call such acts binary acts.
Definition 1 Fix E ∈ Σ. A set of acts R ⊂ A is E -regular with respect to %
if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) R is a mixture set: For all f, g ∈ R and α ∈ (0, 1), αf + (1− α)g ∈ R;
(2) Binary R-independence: For all h ∈ R, for all f, g ∈ B(R, E), α ∈ (0, 1],
f % g ⇔ αf + (1− α)h % αg + (1− α)h;
(3) Weak sure-thing principle for R-binary acts: For all acts f , g, h, h′ in
R, fEh ≻ gEh⇒ fEh
′ % gEh
′.
Note that for any event E the whole set A is E-regular for subjective expected
utility (both state-independent and state-dependent). 4 Another instance of E-
regular acts is the set of constant acts for the multiple prior model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989).
Condition 1 requires that the set of E-regular acts be closed under the mix-
ture operation. Condition 2 is in the spirit of C-independence of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) with the difference that it applies only to R-binary acts.
It means that E-regular acts cannot be used to hedge against R-binary acts.
Condition 2 also entails that the independence axiom holds when restricted
to acts in R. Thus, preferences on E-regular acts are uncertainty neutral on
3 This definition, as well as the definitions and results in the next section are il-
lustrated in Appendix A on three decision models: c-linear biseparable preferences
of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Ghirardato et al. (2005), a state depen-
dent version of the so-called α-MMEU model of Jaffray (1989) and Ghirardato et al.
(2004), and the smooth model of ambiguity aversion of Klibanoff et al. (2005), which,
although not cast in an Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setup, can be partially linked
to results in this paper.
4 Whenever A is a E-regular, then condition 3 in the definition can be disposed of
since it is implied by condition 2.
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the event E 5 and will be of the vNM type. Condition 3 is a weak version
of the sure-thing principle, again restricted to R-binary acts. Note that this
weak property is not violated in Ellsberg kind of experiments. In the multiple
prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), this condition is satisfied, being
a consequence of monotonicity if we take constant acts as the regular acts. 6
3 Rank-dependent additive preferences
3.1 Representation result
As explained above, we will be concerned only with the properties of the
preference relation on the domain of R-binary acts. We thus define a notion
of representation, which is affine with respect to E-regular acts.
Definition 2 Fix E ∈ Σ and R ⊂ A. A function V : B(R, E) → R is an
R-affine representation of % on B(R, E), if
(1) for all f, g ∈ B(R, E), f % g if and only if V (f) ≥ V (g);
(2) for all f ∈ B(R, E), h ∈ R, and α ∈ (0, 1), V (αf +(1−α)h) = αV (f)+
(1− α)V (h).
We now characterize preferences that admit an E-regular set of acts for some
event E, generalizing results known for the class of c-linear biseparable pref-
erences. This representation will be key to establish under which conditions
aggregation is possible.
Proposition 1 Let E ∈ Σ and % be a binary relation on A that satisfies
Axiom 1. Assume that there exists a set R ⊂ A which is E-regular with
respect to % and, furthermore, that % is not degenerate on R (i.e., there exist
f, g ∈ R such that f ≻ g.) Then, there exists an R-affine representation of
% on B(R, E) V : B(R, E) → R, which is unique up to a positive affine
transformation.
Furthermore, for any R-affine representation V of %,
(1) there exist four linear functions V E, V Ec , V E, V Ec from R to R such that
for all f, g ∈ R
V (fEg) =V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f % g
=V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f - g
5 This notion is formally defined in Definition 3 below.
6 Monotonicity requires that if f(s) % g(s) for all s, then f % g.
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(2) there exists kE ∈ R such that for all f, g ∈ R,
V (fEg) + V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g) = k
E |V (f)− V (g)| . (1)
Preferences that satisfy the requirements of Proposition 1 will be called rank-
dependent additive (with respect to R) in the following. Existence of an R-
affine representation is straightforward and well-known (it follows from vNM
like arguments). The first property establishes that the evaluation of binary
acts fEg with f, g ∈ R can be decomposed in a rank-dependent additive
manner, the decomposition being dependent on the ranking of the two acts.
The second property can be seen as a way to identify the agent’s attitude
toward uncertainty attached to an event, which we will define and characterize
in the following section.
Most models of decision under uncertainty cast in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework are rank-dependent additive. Rank-dependent additive preferences
can accommodate state-dependence. This is why, contrary to c-linear bisepa-
rable preferences, “beliefs” do not appear explicitly in the functional. Indeed,
were we to make them explicit, we would get back to the usual problem that,
when allowing for state-dependence, beliefs cannot be uniquely pinned down.
We will discuss this in more details in Section 5.
3.2 Uncertainty neutral rank-dependent additive preferences
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) defined uncertainty aversion as a preference for
mixing: for any acts f, g, f ∼ g ⇒ αf + (1− α)g % f . We will here limit the
domain of application to a smaller set of acts. Furthermore, we define a notion
of uncertainty neutrality rather than uncertainty aversion, as the important
distinction for us will be between agents that are neutral toward uncertainty
and agents that have a non neutral attitude toward uncertainty (uncertainty
averse or seeking). Based on the intuition underlying this definition we propose
the following definition of uncertainty neutrality on an event with respect to a
set of acts. 7
Definition 3 Let E ∈ Σ and D ⊂ A. Say that % is uncertainty neutral on E
with respect to D if for all f, g ∈ B(D, E) such that f ∼ g and all α ∈ (0, 1),
αf + (1− α)g ∼ f .
Obviously, a preference relation that satisfies the independence axiom over
the whole set of acts will be uncertainty neutral on any event. The next claim
proves that rank-additive preferences with kE = 0 are uncertainty neutral on
E.
7 See also Ghirardato et al. (2004).
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Proposition 2 Under the representation of Proposition 1, % is uncertainty
neutral on event E with respect to R if and only if kE = 0. 8
In the following, we argue that in the class of preferences considered, uncer-
tainty neutrality is the crucial property that delimits the frontier between the
possibility and impossibility of linear aggregation.
3.3 Betting attitudes
Although it is difficult to define “beliefs” in our model, in particular because it
allows for state-dependence, we can define a notion of betting preference and
more precisely, give meaning to the idea that two rank-dependent additive
decision makers have the same betting preference on an event E.
Definition 4 Let E ∈ Σ and let %i and %j be preferences satisfying the as-
sumptions of Proposition 1. Say that i and j have the same betting preferences
on E if there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1), f, g ∈ Ri, f
′, g′ ∈ Rj such that f ≻i g and
f ′ ≻j g
′ and
(i) fEg ∼i αf + (1− α)g and f
′
Eg
′ ∼j αf
′ + (1− α)g′, or
(ii) f ∼i αfEg + (1− α)g and f
′ ∼j αf
′
Eg
′ + (1− α)g′, or
(iii) g ∼i αfEg + (1− α)f and g
′ ∼j αf
′
Eg
′ + (1− α)f ′, or
and
(i’) gEf ∼i βg + (1− β)f and g
′
Ef
′ ∼j βg
′ + (1− β)f ′, or
(ii’) g ∼i βgEf + (1− β)f and g
′ ∼j βg
′
Ef
′ + (1− β)f ′, or
(iii’) f ∼i βgEf + (1− β)g and f
′ ∼j βg
′
Ef
′ + (1− β)g′.
In this definition, we use mixing to calibrate the betting behavior of the de-
cision makers on event E, as is customary in an Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) setting. Condition (i) says that both agents evaluate fEg as if they
were placing a weight α on E. The next two conditions would be irrelevant in
a state-independent setting. However, in our setting, it is possible for instance
that f ≻i g but fEg ≻i f . The other three conditions use the same calibrating
technique to assess the agents’ betting behavior on Ec. The weight β could be
greater or smaller than 1− α.
The next proposition shows that the notion of identical betting preferences
is captured, in the representation of Proposition 1, by the fact that the two
agents have the same coefficient kE.
8 When kE = 0, the representation can be additively decomposed since V¯E = V E .
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Proposition 3 Let E ∈ Σ and let %i and %j be preferences satisfying the
assumptions of Proposition 1. If i and j have the same betting preferences on
E then kEi = k
E
j .
This characterization will be useful when we discuss the extension of our
main theorem to situations in which agents have identical betting attitudes,
in relation to Gilboa et al. (2004) argument.
4 Aggregation of rank-dependent additive preferences: an impos-
sibility result
For the aggregation problem to be interesting, one needs to impose some di-
versity among the preferences that one seeks to aggregate. The next definition
provides one such condition (see Mongin (1998)).
Definition 5 The n binary relations {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the Independent Prospects
Property on a set D ⊂ A if for all i ∈ N ′, there exist h⋆i , h⋆i ∈ D such that:
h⋆i ≻i h⋆i and h
⋆
i ∼j h⋆i ∀j ∈ N
′ \ {i}.
On the other hand, it seems natural to impose for the society’s preference
to comply with any unanimous agreement among individuals: If everybody
agree that some alternative f is strictly better than some other alternative g,
so should society. This requirement is formally stated in the following Pareto
Axiom.
Axiom 2 (Pareto) For all f, g ∈ A, [∀i ∈ N ′, f ≻i g ⇒ f ≻0 g].
We can now state our main theorem.
Theorem 1 Fix E ∈ Σ. Let {%i}i∈N be binary relations on A and {Ri}i∈N
be non-empty subsets of A. Assume that
(1) for all i ∈ N , %i satisfies Axiom 1;
(2) for all i ∈ N , Ri is E-regular with respect to %i;
(3) {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the Independent Prospects Property on ∩i∈NRi.
Then, Axiom 2 holds if and only if,
(i) there exist an Ri-affine representation Vi of %i on B(Ri, E) for all i ∈ N ,
unique weights (given the Vi’s) (λ1, · · · , λn) ∈ R
n
+ \ {0}, µ ∈ R such that
∀f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E), V0(f) =
∑
i∈N ′
λiVi(f) + µ;
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(ii) ∀i, j ∈ N ′, i 6= j, λi × λj 6= 0 ⇔ k
E
i = k
E
j = 0.
We next provide an illustrative example and then move on to a discussion of
the theorem.
Example 1 Let N ′ = {1, 2}, S = {α, β} and X = {x, y}. Assume both
agents have multiple prior preferences with the simplex as the set of priors:
Vi(f) = mins∈S ui(f(s)) where ui is linear. Assume u1(x) = 0, u2(x) = 1,
u1(y) = 1, u2(y) = 0, where x (resp. y) is the degenerate lottery yielding x
(resp. y) for sure. Assume that constant acts are regular for both agents and
society. Then, part (i) of the theorem yields that V0 is a weighted sum of the
individuals’ utility: V0 = λV1 + (1− λ)V2.
Then, V0(x, x) = λV1(x, x)+(1−λ)V2(x, x) = 1−λ and V0(y, y) = λV1(y, y)+
(1− λ)V2(y, y) = λ.
Assume the society is also of the multiple prior type. Then, u0(x) = V0(x, x) =
1 − λ and u0(y) = V0(y, y) = λ. Thus, V0(x, y) ≥ min(u0(x), u0(y)) =
min(λ, 1− λ). But note that V0(x, y) = λV1(x, y) + (1− λ)V2(x, y) = 0.
In words the theorem says that, under the assumptions that individuals and
society’s preferences are “well behaved” on a subset of acts –and notably sat-
isfy the independence axiom on this subset–, either society’s preferences are a
linear aggregation of uncertainty neutral individuals’ preferences or there is a
dictator. It cannot be the case that society’s preferences are the result of the
aggregation of an uncertainty averse agent with any other type (uncertainty
averse, loving or neutral) of agent. A consequence is that if society’s prefer-
ences display a non neutral attitude toward uncertainty (of the limited kind
corresponding to the fact that it is not uncertainty neutral on some event with
respect to R0), then it must be dictatorial. Remark that the theorem is in a
sense stronger than Harsanyi’s since uncertainty neutrality of the preferences
is a consequence and not an assumption of the theorem. 9
While we will discuss in the next section variations around this theorem, it is
important to notice here that it applies even if we restrict all agents to have
the same betting preferences on E. It is enough to observe that nothing in the
assumptions of the theorem prevents the fact that all agents have the same
coefficient kE. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let E ∈ Σ. Let {%i}i∈N be binary relations on A and {Ri}i∈N
be non-empty subsets of A. Assume that the condition of Theorem 1 holds
9 This was already the case in Blackorby et al. (2004) study of the aggregation of
rank dependent expected utility agents. As they put it “the EU-like conditions are
to be found here in the conclusion, whereas Harsanyi put them in the assumption;
apparently, he did not realize the logical power of his own framework.”
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and that all agents have the same betting preferences. Then, the conclusion of
Theorem 1 holds as well and it is impossible to aggregate preferences unless
they are all uncertainty neutral on event E.
Thus, what’s driving the impossibility result is not heterogeneity in betting
attitudes. To make this point clear in models where a notion of beliefs have
been defined, consider the class of c-linear biseparable preferences and let Ac
denote the set of constant acts. If for all i ∈ N , %i are c-linear biseparable
and not uncertainty neutral on E, and the Independent Prospects Property
holds on Ac, then Axiom 2 holds if and only if there exists j ∈ N ′ such
that %0=%j. This is a direct consequence of the fact that A
c is regular for c-
linear biseparable preferences and as we establish in the Appendix, that these
preferences are not uncertainty neutral with respect to that set.
Two important particular cases covered are when agents and society have
multiple prior preferences and when they have Choquet expected utility pref-
erences of Schmeidler (1989). Hence, for instance, it is not possible to aggregate
multiple prior preferences into a multiple prior social preferences, irrespective
of the fact that the sets of priors are identical among agents. Whereas in an
expected utility setting it is possible to aggregate agents with the same beliefs,
this does not generalize to non-expected utility settings.
The proof of the theorem is divided into two distinct parts. The first one is a
direct application of Proposition 2 in De Meyer and Mongin (1995). It states
that, given the underlying convex structure (recall we are in an Anscombe-
Aumann setting), the Pareto axiom implies that V0 is a weighted sum of the
Vis. Hence, aggregation has to be linear. The second part can itself be divided
in two.
First, the Independent Prospects Property on ∩i∈NRi states that for any i,
there exist h⋆, h⋆ in ∩i∈NRi such that h
⋆ ≻i h⋆ and h
⋆ ∼j h⋆, ∀j ∈ N
′ \ {i}.
Using these acts for any i, one can establish that for any agent i that has a
non zero weight λi, k
E
i = k
E
0 for any event E. Thus, all agents that are taken
into account in V0 must have the same attitude toward uncertainty.
Second, we prove that kE0 = 0 as soon as there are two agents with non
zero weights. Assume for simplicity that only agent 1 and 2 have non zero
weight. The argument relies on the fact that, using the Independent Prospects
Property and mixing acts, one can find two acts f, g ∈ ∩i∈NRi such that
f ≻1 g and f ≺2 g, while f ∼0 g. The uncertainty neutrality of the preferences
can then be established by computing V0(fEg) + V0(gEf) − V0(f) − V0(g) in
two different ways. The first one is direct and establishes that this quantity is
zero since f ∼0 g. The second one is to compute it decomposing V0 as the sum
of λ1V1 and λ2V2. Using the fact that k
E
1 = k
E
2 = k
E
0 , this last part establishes
that kE0 = 0.
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5 Restoring possibility
In this Section, we provide a discussion of the assumptions made to obtain our
result. We first start by reviewing known arguments to restore possibility in the
expected utility setting and show how they fail to apply in our setting. We also
show that our impossibility result extends to smooth ambiguity averse decision
makers. In the next subsection, we show that dropping some requirement at
the society level might restore the possibility of aggregation.
5.1 What does not work...
5.1.1 Weakening the Pareto axiom
Gilboa et al. (2004) suggested to weaken the Pareto principle to acts on which
the agents have the same beliefs. 10 They established then that it is possible
to aggregate linearly and separately tastes and beliefs. Such a way to restore
possibility would not work in our context. As we argued, even if agents have
the same betting attitudes (which, under expected utility amounts to same
beliefs), aggregation is impossible under uncertainty non neutrality. In the
multiple prior model for instance one can identify, for the sake of the argument,
“beliefs” with the set of priors. Then, as we have shown, aggregation is not
possible even when agents all have the same “beliefs”. Thus weakening the
Pareto principle to acts on which agents have the same betting attitudes does
not appear to be a solution here.
5.1.2 State dependence
As shown by Mongin (1998) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006) (in a Sav-
age setting) a way to circumvent the impossibility of aggregating subjec-
tive expected utility agents when they have different beliefs is to enrich the
possible domain for society’s preferences. Specifically, they allowed for state-
dependence in society’s preferences (while remaining in the subjective utility
class). Since state-dependent preferences are already included in our class of
preferences, our result embeds their possibility result. However, it also shows
that such a way of restoring the possibility of aggregation will not work when
preferences are not uncertainty neutral.
10 Identical beliefs are defined in their paper in terms of the representation rather
than in terms of the preferences.
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5.1.3 Impossibility with smooth preferences: an example
We provide here an example in which the class of preferences considered is of
the “smooth ambiguity averse” type a` la Klibanoff et al. (2005) and in which
aggregation is not possible. Consider two agents, 1 and 2, and denote soci-
ety as above by 0. Let Vi(fEg) = ϕ
−1
i [pi(E)ϕi (Ui(f)) + (1− pi(E))ϕi (Ui(g))]
for i = 0, 1, 2, where pi is a unique subjective probability distribution, Ui
is a vNM utility function on Ac and ϕi is the second level utility function
which captures attitude toward ambiguity. Assume ϕi, i = 1, 2 is strictly con-
cave, reflecting ambiguity aversion. Assume furthermore that the Independent
Prospects Property holds on Ac. Since Harsanyi’s conditions are satisfied on
these acts, it has to be the case that U0 = α1U1 +α2U2, for some α1, α2 ∈ R+.
Assume without loss of generality that α1 ≥ α2. Let E be an event and assume
for the sake of simplicity that p1(E) = p2(E) = 1/2.
¿From the Independent Prospects Property, there exist three constant acts
x, y, and z such that 1 prefers x to y and 2 prefers y to x, while z is indifferent
to y for 1 and to x for 2.
U1 U2 U0
x 1 0 α1
y 0 1 α2
z 0 0 0
Construct now the three constant acts h, k, and ℓ as follows:
h=
1
8
(
1−
α2
α1
)
x +
1
4
y +
(
5
8
+
1
8
α2
α1
)
z,
k=
1
8
(
1 +
α2
α1
)
x +
(
7
8
−
1
8
α2
α1
)
z;
ℓ=
1
8
x +
1
8
y +
3
4
z.
These three acts are constructed so that society is indifferent among them,
while 1 and 2 have opposite preferences on them, namely k ≻1 ℓ ≻1 h and
h ≻2 ℓ ≻2 k Indeed, direct computation yields the following table:
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U1 U2 U0
h 1
8
(1− α2
α1
) 1
4
α1+α2
8
k 1
8
(1 + α2
α1
) 0 α1+α2
8
ℓ 1
8
1
8
α1+α2
8
Since society is indifferent among these three constant acts, it cannot exhibit
any uncertainty attitude with respect to, for instance, the binary act of the
kind hEk. In particular, hEk is indifferent from the society view point to ℓ.
Hence, it will fail to capture the uncertainty non neutrality of agents 1 and 2.
We now make this more precise.
Observe that V0(hEk) = ϕ
−1
0 [p0(E)ϕ0 (U0(h)) + (1− p0(E))ϕ0 (U0(k))] =
α1+α2
8
=
V0(ℓ). Hence, society is indifferent between ℓ and hEk. Let’s now show that
Vi(ℓ) > Vi(hEk) for i = 1, 2 thus establishing a violation of the Pareto axiom
By construction V1(ℓ) = ϕ
−1
1
[
1/2ϕ1
(
1
8
)
+ 1/2ϕ1
(
1
8
)]
= 1
8
, and similarly,
V2(ℓ) =
1
8
.
Furthermore, V1(hEk) = ϕ
−1
1
[
1/2ϕ1
(
1
8
(1− α2
α1
)
)
+ 1/2ϕ1
(
1
8
(1 + α2
α1
)
)]
. Given
that ϕ1 is assumed to be strictly concave, one has
V1(hEk) < ϕ
−1
1
[
ϕ1
(
1/2
(
1
8
(1−
α2
α1
)
)
+ 1/2
(
1
8
(1 +
α2
α1
)
))]
=
1
8
.
In a similar fashion, it is easy to establish that
V2(hEk) < ϕ
−1
1
[
ϕ1
(
1/2
(
1
4
)
+ 1/2 (0)
)]
=
1
8
.
We then get the contradiction to the Pareto axiom we were after, namely
V1(hEk) < V1(ℓ) and V2(hEk) < V2(ℓ) while V0(hEk) = V0(ℓ). Observe that
the argument in the example follows closely the one of the proof of Theorem
1 (see the intuition given page 11). Note also that we do not need to specify
the distortion function ϕi and hence that this example shows that aggregation
fails even when agents have the same attitude toward ambiguity.
This example, which is not pathological, shows that it is not possible to
prove an aggregation result concerning ambiguity averse agents a` la Klibanoff
et al. (2005). As we show in Appendix A, these preferences fail to satisfy
Ac-independence, but do satisfy the weak sure-thing principle, while they ob-
viously satisfy the independence axiom on Ac (being of the vNM type on this
domain). This, we conjecture, might be enough to show a more general im-
possibility result, namely that if preferences satisfy the independence axiom
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on {Ri}i∈N and the weak sure-thing principle for {Ri}i∈N -binary acts, then
the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds, that is, it is not possible to aggregate
uncertainty non neutral agents. This however would require to have a more
general decision theoretic model in which binary independence does not hold.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) is one such model but a rather specific one and a general
characterization remains to be done.
5.2 What might work...
We now explore what type of result is achievable relaxing the independent
prospects property, binary independence and the weak sure-thing principle.
5.2.1 Same risk preferences
Embedded in the assumptions of the Theorem is the fact that social prefer-
ences has a rich set of regular acts. Conditions 2 and 3 indeed entail that there
exists a set on which binary R-independence holds for all preferences and such
that, on this set, the Independent Prospects Property hold. One might wonder
what would happen, were one to relax this assumption. Assume that there is
a set R which is E-regular for the society and for all individuals. Assume that
all individuals have the same preferences on R, which means that Indepen-
dent Prospects fails to hold. Then, Axiom 2 holds if and only if there exists
an affine representation V0 on B(R, E) of %0 which is a linear aggregation of
the individuals’ affine Vi’s.
Hence, if all agents have the same risk preferences (i.e., their preferences on
R) but different betting preferences, then aggregation is possible and amounts
to linear aggregation.
Note also that if all individuals have the same preferences on a set R which
is E-regular for them, then Axiom 2 implies that society’s preferences are the
same as the individuals’ on R and therefore satisfy the independence axiom
on this set. In that case, V0 coincides with the Vi’s on R. On the other hand,
R is not necessarily E-regular for the society and R-independence might fail.
5.2.2 Diversity and R-independence
The preceding subsection shows that the diversity condition is critical to ob-
tain our result. This condition is a joint condition on individuals’ and society’s
preferences. One might wonder if diversity restricted to individuals’ preferences
alone implies a form of impossibility theorem. As we have explained above,
if the diversity condition is imposed on individuals’ preferences, then Axiom
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2 imposes only that the society’s preferences satisfy the independence axiom
on subsets of the intersection of the individuals’ E-regular sets where all in-
dividuals have the same preferences. Besides this fact, there is nothing in our
approach that constrains ∩i∈N ′Ri to be E-regular for the society.
11 In this
case, our theorem does not apply and aggregation might be possible. Take for
instance, V0(f) = mini Vi(f). This represents a preference for the society, that
respects the Pareto axiom. But it is not clear what axioms this preference
obeys besides Axiom 1.
5.2.3 Dropping the weak sure-thing principle
The next result shows that linear aggregation is possible if one is willing
to drop the weak sure-thing principle at the society’s level. In other words,
defining V0 as
∑
i λiVi is an aggregation procedure that satisfies the Pareto
axiom. Furthermore, V0 hence defined satisfies the independence axiom with
respect to mixing with acts in ∩i∈NRi. However, it violates the weak sure-thing
principle.
Proposition 4 Let E ∈ Σ. Let {%i}i∈N be binary relations on A and {Ri}i∈N
be non-empty subsets of A. Assume that
(1) for all i ∈ N , %i satisfies Axiom 1;
(2) for all i ∈ N ′, Ri is E-regular with respect to %i;
(3) {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the Independent Prospects Property on ∩i∈NRi;
(4) For all f ∈ ∩i∈NRi, for all g, h ∈ A, α ∈ (0, 1], g %0 h⇔ αg+(1−α)f %0
αh + (1− α)f .
Then, Axiom 2 holds if and only if, there exists an Ri-affine representation Vi
of %i for all i ∈ N , unique weights (λ1, · · · , λn) ∈ R
n
+ \ {0}, µ ∈ R such that
∀f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E), V0(f) =
∑
i∈N ′
λiVi(f) + µ.
This way of aggregating preferences has the same pros and cons as those
identified in the discussion of Harsanyi’s theorem (see Weymark (1991) and
Mongin (2002) for instance). In particular, if one wants to use this theorem
as an operational means to identify society’s preferences, then one is forced to
adopt some extra assumptions bearing on inter-personal welfare comparisons
(via cardinalization of the preferences for instance).
What are the consequences of abandoning the weak sure-thing principle for
binary acts for the society? When it is relaxed, it is not possible to define
11 Arguments along the line of Diamond (1967), Sen (1970), Epstein and Segal (1992)
might give a justification for the fact that ∩i∈N ′Ri is not E-regular for society.
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conditional preferences any longer. Thus, it is not possible to construct ex ante
preferences from a notion of conditional preferences. At best, an incomplete
notion of conditional preferences (f ☎E0 g if and only if fEh %0 gEh for all
h ∈ R) can be defined.
The important consequence of this technical remark is that dominance reason-
ing is hence not possible at the society’s level. In the multiple prior example,
even if one obtains a vNM utility function u0 for the society, it is not pos-
sible to conclude that an act that yields higher utility to another act state
by state is preferred to that latter act. If one considers that dominance is a
property that individuals’ preferences should satisfy, then linear aggregation
is here possible at the cost of assuming that the society’s preferences do not
satisfy the same “rationality” criteria as individuals.
6 Concluding remarks
We have explored in detail the (im)possibility of aggregating preferences un-
der uncertainty and have established that under rather weak requirements,
expected utility over the entire domain is actually a necessary condition to
obtain a possibility result. For decision makers who have expected utility over
lotteries, there is no scope for any non neutral attitude toward uncertainty if
one wants to be able to construct a social preference (that also respect ex-
pected utility over lotteries). Thus, for instance, the notion of a representative
multiple prior agent does not make much sense (even in the particular case in
which all agents have the same set of priors).
We also identified the conditions that are at the heart of the impossibility
results. Dropping a monotonicity requirement (the weak sure-thing principle
on binary acts) at the society’s level restores the possibility of aggregation
a` la Harsanyi. As we argued in the previous section, this comes at a cost
since a consequence of dropping this requirement is that society’s conditional
preferences are not well-defined, in the sense that they do not form a complete
order, and therefore dominance arguments become irrelevant. However, one
could proceed with this incompleteness, and also assume that society’s ex
ante preferences be incomplete. We leave this exploration for further research.
Another research avenue would be to conduct a systematic study of what kind
of aggregation result is allowed when one drops the requirement that social
preferences match the individuals’ indifference to mixing on a rich set of acts,
as alluded to in section 5.2.2.
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Appendix A: Examples
In this Appendix, we provide three illustrations of our decision theoretic con-
structs.
A1. c-linear biseparable preferences
For any subset F of A, let B(F) = {fEg |f, g ∈ F and E ∈ Σ}.
% is c-linear biseparable if it can be represented by a function V : A → R,
such that:
(1) for f, g ∈ Ac, f º g, V (fEg) = ρ(E)u(f) + (1 − ρ(E))u(g) where ρ is a
capacity;
(2) V (αf + (1− α)g) = αV (f) + (1− α)V (g) for all f ∈ B(Ac) and g ∈ Ac.
Claim 3 Ac is E-regular for c-linear biseparable preferences for any event E.
Proof. Let E ∈ Σ be an event. That such preferences satisfy binary Ac-
independence is a direct implication of the fact that V (αf + (1 − α)g) =
αV (f) + (1− α)V (g) for all f ∈ B(Ac, E) and g ∈ Ac.
Let’s now check that these preferences satisfy the weak sure-thing principle
for Ac-binary acts as well. Let f, g, h, h′ be constant acts. Assume for instance
that f % h and h % g, (other cases can be dealt with in a similar manner).
Note that this implies that f % g. Assume finally that fEh ≻ gEh. This
implies:
ρ(E)u(f) + (1− ρ(E))u(h) > (1− ρ(Ec))u(g) + ρ(Ec)u(h).
We now check that fEh
′ % gEh
′ for any h′ ∈ Ac. Three cases must be consid-
ered.
Case 1 : f % h′ and g % h′.
In this case,
fEh
′ % gEh
′⇔ ρ(E)u(f) + (1− ρ(E))u(h′) ≥ ρ(E)u(g) + (1− ρ(E))u(h′)
⇔u(f) ≥ u(g),
which is the case by assumption.
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Case 2 : f % h′ and h′ % g.
In this case,
fEh
′ % gEh
′⇔ ρ(E)u(f) + (1− ρ(E))u(h′) ≥ (1− ρ(Ec))u(g) + ρ(Ec)u(h′)
⇔ ρ(E)u(f) + (1− ρ(Ec))u(h′) ≥ ρ(E)u(h′) + (1− ρ(Ec))u(g),
which is the case since u(f) ≥ u(h′) ≥ u(g).
Case 3 : h′ % f and h′ % g.
In this case,
fEh
′ % gEh
′⇔ (1− ρ(Ec))u(f) + ρ(Ec)u(h′) ≥ (1− ρ(Ec))u(g) + ρ(Ec)u(h′)
⇔u(f) ≥ u(g),
which is the case by assumption.
Claim 4 c-linear bi-separable preferences are rank-dependent additive with
respect to Ac for any event E.
Proof. Define V E(f) = ρ(E)u(f) and V Ec = (1−ρ(E))u(g), and observe that,
when f ≻ g, V (fEg) = ρ(E)u(f)+(1−ρ(E))u(g). The decomposition for g % f
is done in a similar fashion. Note finally that if f % g, V (fEg) + V (gEf) −
V (f) − V (g) = ρ(E)u(f) + (1 − ρ(E))u(g) + ρ(Ec)u(f) + (1 − ρ(Ec))u(g) −
u(f)−u(g) = (ρ(E)+ρ(Ec)−1)(u(f)−u(g)). Defining kE = ρ(E)+ρ(Ec)−1
yields the desired result (property 2 in the proposition).
Claim 5 c-linear bi-separable preferences fail in general to be uncertainty neu-
tral on an event E with respect to Ac.
Proof. Let f, g, h, ℓ ∈ Ac be such that f ≻ g and ℓ ≻ h. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and
assume w.l.o.g. (αf + (1− α)h) ≻ (αg + (1− α)ℓ). Then,
V (αfEg + (1− α)hEℓ) =V ((λf + (1− λ)h)E(λg + (1− λ)ℓ))
=αV (fEg) + (1− α)[ρ(E)u(h) + (1− ρ
c(E))u(ℓ)].
Therefore, these preferences are uncertainty neutral on an event E with respect
to Ac if, and only if ρ(E) = 1− ρ(Ec), which does not hold in general.
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A2. State dependent α-MMEU
% is a state-dependent α−MMEU preference if it can be represented by
V (f) = αmin
p∈C
Epus(f(s)) + (1− α) max
p∈C
Epus(f(s)),
where us is an affine function on Y for all s ∈ S.
Claim 6 Let E ∈ Σ. The set Acv = {f ∈ A s.th. ∀s, t us(f(s)) = ut(f(t))} of
constant utility acts is E-regular for state-dependent α−MMEU preferences.
Proof. Notice first that Acv is a mixture set. Second, it is also easy to establish
that V (αf+(1−α)g) = αV (f)+(1−α)V (g) for all f ∈ B(Acv, E) and g ∈ Acv.
Third, we check that condition 3 of Definition 1 holds as well. Remark that
for all f, h ∈ Acv, one has:
V (fEh) = αmin
p∈C
(p(E)V (f) + (1− p(E))V (h))
+ (1− α) max
p∈C
(p(E)V (f) + (1− p(E))V (h))
=


(
αp(E) + (1− α)p(E)
)
V (f)
+
(
α(1− p(E)) + (1− α)(1− p(E))
)
V (h) if V (f) ≥ V (h)(
αp(E) + (1− α)p(E)
)
V (f)
+
(
α(1− p(E)) + (1− α)(1− p(E))
)
V (h) if V (f) ≤ V (h)
where p(E) = minp∈C p(E) and p(E) = minp∈C p(E).
Now, for all f, g, h ∈ Acv, it is straightforward, using the expression obtained
for V (fEh) and looking at all the possible ranking of V (f), V (g), V (h), to
check that V (fEh) ≥ V (gEh) if and only if V (f) ≥ V (g), thus establishing
that property 2 holds.
Claim 7 State-dependent α-MMEU are rank-dependent additive for event E
with respect to Acv
Proof. Recall that
V (fEh) =


(
αp(E) + (1− α)p(E)
)
V (f)
+
(
α(1− p(E)) + (1− α)(1− p(E))
)
V (h) if V (f) ≥ V (h)(
αp(E) + (1− α)p(E)
)
V (f)
+
(
α(1− p(E)) + (1− α)(1− p(E))
)
V (h) if V (f) ≤ V (h)
where p(E) = minp∈C p(E) and p(E) = minp∈C p(E).
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To conclude that state-dependent α-MMEU are rank-dependent additive with
respect to Acv, it is enough to identify the functions V E, V Ec , V E, and V Ec
by looking at the expression obtained for V (fEh).
Claim 8 Let E ∈ Σ. State-dependent α−MMEU fail in general to be un-
certainty neutral for E with respect to the set of constant utility acts Acv =
{f ∈ A s.th. ∀s, t us(f(s)) = ut(f(t))}.
Proof. Let f, g, h, ℓ ∈ Ac be such that f ≻ g and ℓ ≻ h. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and
assume wlog (λf + (1− λ)h) ≻ (λg + (1− λ)ℓ). Let p¯(E) (resp. p(E)) be the
upper (resp. lower) probability of E in C. Then,
V (λfEg + (1− λ)hEℓ) =V ((λf + (1− λ)h)E(λg + (1− λ)ℓ))
=αmin
p∈C
Epus(λf(s) + (1− λ)h(s))
+(1− α) max
p∈C
Epus(λg(s) + (1− λℓ(s))
=αp(E)[λV (f) + (1− λ)V (h)]
+(1− α)p¯(E)[λV (g) + (1− λ)V (ℓ)]
=λV (fEg) + (1− λ)[p(E)V (h) + p¯(E)V (ℓ)].
Therefore, V is uncertainty neutral on E with respect to Acv only if p¯(E) =
p(E), which does not hold in general.
A3. Smooth ambiguity aversion
% is smoothly ambiguity averse on B(Ac, E) if it can be represented by:
V (fEg) = ϕ
−1 [p(E)ϕ (U(f)) + (1− p(E))ϕ (U(g))] ,
on B(Ac, E), where p is a unique subjective probability distribution, U is a
vNM utility function on Ac and ϕ is the second level utility function which
captures attitude toward ambiguity.
Claim 9 Smooth ambiguity averse preferences violate binary Ac independence.
Proof. Note that for all f, g, h ∈ Ac and λ ∈ (0, 1):
V (λfEg + (1− λ)h) =ϕ
−1[p(E)ϕ(λU(f) + (1− λ)U(h))
+(1− p(E))ϕ(λU(g) + (1− λ)U(l))]
6=λV (fEg) + (1− λ)V (h) unless ϕ is linear.
In other words, this functional is not linear with respect to probabilistic com-
bination between Ac-binary acts and constant acts.
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Claim 10 Smooth ambiguity averse preferences satisfy the weak sure-thing
principle and independence on Ac.
Proof. Since V (fEh) = ϕ
−1 [p(E)V (f) + (1− p(E))V (h)], V (fEh) > V (gEh)
implies V (f) > V (g), and V (fEh
′) > V (gEh
′) for any h′ ∈ Ac.
Independence holds given that preferences on constant acts are vNM.
Observe that smooth ambiguity averse preferences are not rank-dependent
additive.
Claim 11 Let E ∈ Σ. Smooth ambiguity averse preferences in general not
uncertainty neutral on E with respect to the set of constant acts.
Proof. Since smooth ambiguity averse preferences reduce to expected utility
on constant acts, they are uncertainty neutral with respect to Ac.
Now, let f, g, h, ℓ ∈ Ac and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
V (λfEg + (1− λ)hEℓ) =V ((λf + (1− λ)h)E(λg + (1− λ)ℓ))
=ϕ−1[p(E)ϕ(λU(f) + (1− λ)U(h))
+(1− p(E))ϕ(λU(g) + (1− λ)U(l))].
On the other hand,
λV (fEg) + (1− λ)V (hEℓ) = λϕ
−1 [p(E)ϕ (U(f)) + (1− p(E))ϕ (U(g))]
+ (1− λ)ϕ−1 [p(E)ϕ (U(h)) + (1− p(E))ϕ (U(l))] .
Therefore, these preferences are uncertainty neutral with respect to Ac only
if ϕ is linear, i.e., when these preferences satisfy the reduction of compound
lottery axiom, in which case they are ambiguity neutral according to Klibanoff
et al. (2005).
Appendix B
B1. Proof of Proposition 1
Existence of anR-affine representation follows from a usual vNM kind of proof
and is omitted here.
Next, for sake of simplicity we prove the properties 1 & 2 at the same time.
Let V be any R-affine representation of %.
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For any event E and acts f, g ∈ R, say that f DE g if for all act h ∈ R,
fEh % gEh. This relation is well-defined since % satisfies the weak sure-thing
principle for binary acts. Denote ⊲E and ≈E strict preference and indifference
respectively. It can be checked that by definition of R, DE satisfies the vNM
axioms.
The proof is decomposed in two depending on whether there exist f⋆, f⋆ ∈ R
such that V (f⋆Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) 6= V (f⋆) + V (f⋆) or not.
Case 1.
There exist f ⋆, f⋆ ∈ R such that V (f
⋆
Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) 6= V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)
As a first step, we show that either DE=DEc or DEc is a reverse order of DE,
in the sense that f DEc g if and only if g DE f , for all f, g ∈ R. In step 2, we
complete the proof of properties 1 and 2.
Step 1. DE=DEc or DEc is a reverse order of DE
Suppose that f⋆ % f⋆. Then, we necessarily must be in one of the following
cases:
• f ⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f
⋆ ⊲Ec f⋆,
• f ⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ DEc f
⋆,
• f⋆ DE f
⋆ and f⋆ ⊲Ec f⋆
• f⋆ DE f
⋆ and f⋆ DEc f
⋆.
This last case is not possible. Indeed, f⋆ DE f
⋆ implies that f⋆ % f
⋆
Ef⋆ and
f⋆Ef
⋆ % f⋆ while f⋆ DEc f
⋆ implies that f⋆ % f⋆Ef
⋆ and f⋆Ef⋆ % f
⋆. Thus
f⋆ % f
⋆
Ef⋆, f⋆Ef
⋆ % f⋆ while by assumption f⋆ % f⋆ and therefore f
⋆
Ef⋆ ∼
f⋆Ef
⋆ ∼ f⋆ ∼ f
⋆ and thus V (f ⋆Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) = V (f ⋆) + V (f⋆) which leads
to a contradiction.
Therefore, we essentially have only two cases to consider : (a) f⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and
f⋆ ⊲Ec f⋆, and (b) f
⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ DEc f
⋆ (the third case being the symmetric
of case (b)).
Case (a): f ⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f
⋆ ⊲Ec f⋆.
Let us prove that DE=DEc . Assume to the contrary that there exist f, g ∈ R
such that f ⊲E g while g DEc f . W.l.o.g, we can take these acts such that
f⋆ ⊲E f ⊲E g ⊲E f⋆ and f
⋆ DEc g DEc f DEc f⋆. Indeed, we can always
exhibit two acts satisfying our conditions by mixing f and g with either f ⋆or
f⋆. Then there exist a, a
c, b, bc ∈ (0, 1) such that 1 ≥ a > b ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ bc ≥
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ac ≥ 0 and
f ≈E af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
f ≈Ec a
cf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆;
g ≈E bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆;
g≈Ec b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆.
Assume a > ac. By definition ofR, f ∼ (af ⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (a
cf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆).
Hence,
V (f) =V ((af ⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (a
cf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆))
=V
(
a− ac
1− ac
f⋆E (a
cf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆) +
1− a
1− ac
(acf⋆ + (1− acf⋆)
)
=
a− ac
1− ac
V (f⋆E (a
cf ⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆)) +
1− a
1− ac
V (acf ⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆)
=
a− ac
1− ac
(acV (f⋆) + (1− ac)V (f ⋆Ef⋆))
+
1− a
1− ac
(acV (f ⋆) + (1− ac)V (f⋆))
= acV (f⋆) + (a− ac)V (f ⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆) .
Since f ∈ R,
V
(
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆Ef
⋆
)
=
1
1 + a− ac
V (f) +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
=
1
1 + a− ac
(acV (f ⋆) + (a− ac)V (f ⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆))
+
a− ac
1 + a− ac
V (f⋆Ef
⋆) .
But we also have by definition of R,
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V
(
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆Ef
⋆
)
= V
((
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E
(
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
= V
((
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E
(
1
1 + a− ac
f +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
= V
((
1
1 + a− ac
(af⋆ + (1− a)f⋆) +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E(
1
1 + a− ac
(acf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆) +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
= V
((
1
1 + a− ac
(af⋆ + (1− a)f⋆) +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E(
1
1 + a− ac
(acf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆) +
a− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
= V
((
a
1 + a− ac
f⋆ +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E
(
a
1 + a− ac
f⋆ +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
= V
((
a
1 + a− ac
f⋆ +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
)
E
(
a
1 + a− ac
f⋆ +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
f⋆
))
=
a
1 + a− ac
V (f ⋆) +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
V (f⋆)
=
a
1 + a− ac
V (f ⋆) +
1− ac
1 + a− ac
V (f⋆).
Therefore,
(acV (f⋆) + (a− ac)V (f⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆)) + (a− a
c)V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
= aV (f⋆) + (1− ac)V (f⋆) ,
which is equivalent to (a− ac) (V (f ⋆Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆)) = (a− ac) (V (f⋆) +
V (f⋆)). This contradicts the fact that V (f
⋆
Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) 6= V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)
and a > ac. In the case where a ≤ ac, then either a < ac or a = ac but in this
last event, b < bc and the proof can be easily adapted in both cases. Hence,
DE=DEc .
Case (b) : f ⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ DEc f
⋆.
In this case, we show that DEc is a reverse order of DE, that is, for all f, g ∈ R,
f DE g if and only if g DEc f .
Observe first that it has to be the case that f⋆ ⊲Ec f
⋆. Indeed, if f⋆ ≈Ec
f⋆, then by definition of R, f ⋆ ∼ f ⋆Ef⋆ and f⋆ ∼ f⋆Ef
⋆ and thus V (f ⋆Ef⋆) +
V (f⋆Ef
⋆) = V (f⋆) + V (f⋆).
Suppose DEc is not a reverse order of DE, that is, there exist f, g ∈ R ,
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such that f ⊲E g while f DEc g. As in case (a), we can assume w.l.o.g that
f⋆ ⊲E f ⊲E g ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ DEc f DEc g DEc f
⋆. Then, there exist a,
ac, b, bc ∈ (0, 1) with a > b and ac ≤ bc such that
f ≈E af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
f ≈Ec a
cf⋆ + (1− ac)f⋆;
g ≈E bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆;
g≈Ec b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆.
Either a > ac, or a < ac, or a = ac and b < bc. In the case a > ac, we
can replicate the argument for case (a) to show that (a− ac) (V (f ⋆Ef⋆) +
V (f⋆Ef
⋆)) = (a− ac) (V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)). The proof can be adapted to the
other cases to show a similar contradiction.
Step2. Properties 1 and 2 hold when there exist f, g ∈ R such that V (fEg) +
V (gEf) 6= V (f) + V (g)
Case (a) DE=DEc .
Given that % is not degenerate on R, there exist f ⋆, f⋆ ∈ R such that f
⋆ ≻ f⋆.
Thus, define for any f
V E(f) =
V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f);
V E(f) =
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
V (f ⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f);
V Ec(f) =
V (f⋆Ef
⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f ⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f);
V Ec(f) =
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f).
Let us prove that for all f, g ∈ R,
V (fEg) =V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f % g
=V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f - g.
Consider f, g ∈ R such that f % g and consider the case where V (f ⋆) ≥
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V (f) ≥ V (g) ≥ V (f⋆). We have that
f ≈E
V (f)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
f⋆ +
(
1−
V (f)− V (f⋆)
V (f ⋆)− V (f⋆)
)
f⋆,
and
g ≈Ec
V (g)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
f ⋆ +
(
1−
V (g)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
)
f⋆.
By definition of R, fEg ∼ (af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆) where a =
V (f)−V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆)
and b = V (g)−V (f⋆))
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆)
. Thus
V (fEg) =V ((af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆))
= bV (f⋆) + (a− b)V (f⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆)
=
(V (g)− V (f⋆))V (f
⋆) + (V (f)− V (g))V (f⋆Ef⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
+
(V (f⋆)− V (f))V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
=
(V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f⋆))V (f) + (V (f
⋆)− V (f⋆Ef⋆))V (g)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
=V E(f) + V Ec(g).
In the case where V (f ⋆) ≥ V (g) ≥ V (f) ≥ V (f⋆), a similar computation
shows that V (fEg) = V E(f) + V Ec(g).
In the other cases, the proof can be easily adapted to show that
V (fEg) =V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f % g
=V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f - g.
Define kE =
V (f⋆
E
f⋆)+V (f⋆Ef
⋆)−V (f⋆)−V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆)
.
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If f % g,
V (fEg) + V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g)
= V E(f) + V Ec(g) + V E(g) + V Ec(f)
− V E(f)− V Ec(f)− V E(g)− V Ec(g)
= V Ec(f)− V Ec(f) + V Ec(g)− V Ec(g)
=
(
V (f⋆Ef
⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f ⋆)− V (f⋆)
−
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
)
V (f)
−
(
V (f⋆Ef
⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
−
V (f ⋆)− V (f ⋆Ef⋆)
V (f ⋆)− V (f⋆)
)
V (g)
= kE (V (f)− V (g)) .
If f - g,
V (fEg) + V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g)
= V E(f) + V Ec(g) + V E(g) + V Ec(f)
− V E(f)− V Ec(f)− V E(g)− V Ec(g)
= V Ec(f)− V Ec(f) + V Ec(g)− V Ec(g)
= kE (V (g)− V (f)) .
Case (b): DEc is a reverse order of DE.
Let f⋆, f⋆ ∈ R be such that V (f
⋆
Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) 6= V (f ⋆) + V (f⋆). Without
loss of generality, suppose that f ⋆ % f⋆, f
⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ ⊲Ec f
⋆.
Consider V E, V E the vNM utility functions representing DE and V Ec , V Ec
the vNM utility functions representing DEc such that
• V E (f
⋆) = V Ec (f
⋆) = V (f⋆);
• V E (f
⋆) = V Ec (f
⋆) = 0;
• V E (f⋆) = V (f
⋆) + V (f⋆)− V (f
⋆
Ef⋆);
• V E (f⋆) = V (f⋆Ef
⋆)− V (f⋆);
• V Ec (f⋆) = V (f
⋆) + V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef
⋆);
• V Ec (f⋆) = V (f
⋆
Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆).
Note that it is possible to choose this normalization for these vNM utility
functions since f ⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ ⊲Ec f
⋆ and thus
V (f⋆Ef⋆) > V (f
⋆) , V (f⋆) > V (f⋆Ef
⋆),
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which implies that V E (f
⋆) > V E (f⋆), V E (f
⋆) > V E (f⋆), V Ec (f⋆) > V Ec (f
⋆)
and V Ec (f⋆) > V Ec (f
⋆).
Let us prove that for all f, g ∈ R,
V (fEg) =V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f % g
=V E(f) + V Ec(g) if f - g.
Let f, g ∈ R such that f % g. Consider a first case where f ⋆ DE f DE f⋆ and
f⋆ DE g DE f⋆. Then there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that
f ≈E af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
g≈E bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆.
Since DEc is a reverse order of DE, we also have that
f ≈Ec af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
g≈Ec bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆.
Then, by definition of R, f ∼ af ⋆ + (1− a)f⋆ and g ∼ bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆. Since
f % g and f⋆ % f⋆, we get that a ≥ b. Thus,
V (fEg) =V ((af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆))
= bV (f⋆) + (a− b)V (f⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆)
= aV (f⋆) + (1− a)(V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)− V (f
⋆
Ef⋆)) + 0.b
+(1− b)(V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
= aV E (f
⋆) + (1− a)V E (f⋆) + bV Ec (f
⋆) + (1− b)V Ec (f⋆)
=V E (af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆) + V Ec (bf
⋆ + (1− b)f⋆)
=V E (f) + V Ec (g) .
Consider a second case where f DE f
⋆ and f⋆ DE g. Then, there exist a,
b ∈ (0, 1) such that
f⋆ ≈E af + (1− a)g and f⋆ ≈E bf + (1− b)g,
and
f⋆ ≈Ec af + (1− a)g and f⋆ ≈Ec bf + (1− b)g,
and f⋆ ∼ af + (1− a)g and f⋆ ∼ bf + (1− b)g. Thus a > b and
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V (f⋆Ef⋆) =V ((af + (1− a)g)E (bf + (1− b)g))
= bV (f) + (a− b)V (fEg) + (1− a)V (g) .
Thus
V (fEg) =
V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− bV (f)− (1− a)V (g)
a− b
.
We also have
V E (f) =
(1− b)V E (f
⋆)− (1− a)V E (f⋆)
a− b
;
V Ec (g) =
bV Ec (f
⋆)− aV Ec (f⋆)
b− a
.
and thus
V E (f) +V Ec (g)
=
(1− b)V E (f
⋆)− (1− a)V E (f⋆)− bV Ec (f
⋆) + aV Ec (f⋆)
a− b
=
(1− b)V E (f
⋆)− (1− a)V E (f⋆)− bV Ec (f
⋆) + aV Ec (f⋆)
a− b
=
(1− b)V (f⋆)− (1− a) (V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)− V (f
⋆
Ef⋆))
a− b
+
a (V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
a− b
=
V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− bV (f
⋆)− (1− a)V (f⋆)
a− b
=
V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− b (aV (f) + (1− a)V (g))
a− b
−
(1− a) (bV (f) + (1− b)V (g))
a− b
=
V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− bV (f)− (1− a)V (g)
a− b
.
which proves that V (fEg) = V E (f) + V Ec (g).
The proof can be adapted in the cases where f DE f
⋆ and g DE f
⋆ (or
f⋆ DE g DE f⋆), or f
⋆ DE g DE f⋆ and f⋆ DE g, or f⋆ DE f and f⋆ DE g.
Assume now that f ⋆ DE f DE f⋆ and g ⊲E f
⋆. Then, there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1)
such that
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f ≈E af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
f⋆≈E bg + (1− b)f⋆.
Then we also have f ≈Ec af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆ and f
⋆ ≈Ec bg+ (1− b)f⋆, and thus,
f ∼ af ⋆ + (1− a)f⋆ and f
⋆ ∼ bg + (1− b)f⋆, which yields a contradiction to
the fact that f % g.
We can prove that a similar contradiction occurs if we assume f⋆ DE f and
g ⊲E f⋆.
Since V E, V E are vNM representations of DE, V Ec , V Ec are vNM representa-
tions of DEc and since they are two reverse orders, the uniqueness conditions
imply that
• V E =
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
V (f⋆Ef⋆)−V (f⋆)
(
V E − V (f
⋆)
)
;
• V Ec =
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆Ef⋆)
(
V E − V (f
⋆)
)
+ V (f⋆);
• V Ec =
V (f⋆Ef⋆)−V (f⋆)
V (f⋆)−V (f⋆Ef⋆)
(
V E − V (f
⋆)
)
.
Note that for all f ∈ R, V (f) = V (f
⋆)−V (f⋆)
V (f⋆Ef⋆)−V (f⋆)
V E(f) +
V (f⋆Ef⋆)−V (f⋆)
V (f⋆Ef⋆)−V (f⋆)
V (f ⋆).
Let’s now check that the representation satisfies property 2.
If f % g,
V (fEg) +V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g)
= V Ec(f)− V Ec(f) + V Ec(g)− V Ec(g)
=
(
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef
⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef⋆)
−
V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆)
V (f⋆)− V (f ⋆Ef⋆)
)(
V E(f)− V E(g)
)
=
V (f⋆)− V (f⋆)
V (f⋆Ef⋆)− V (f⋆)
(
V E(f)− V E(g)
)
= V (f)− V (g).
If f - g,
V (fEg) + V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g) =V Ec(f)− V Ec(f) + V Ec(g)− V Ec(g)
=V (g)− V (f).
Case 2.
For all f, g ∈ R, V (fEg) + V (gEf)− V (f)− V (g) = 0.
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If for all f, g ∈ R, fEg ∼ f , then for VE = V and VEc = 0, we have that
V (fEg) = VE (f) + VEc (g) which proves that properties 1 and 2 hold.
Suppose now that there exist f⋆, f⋆ ∈ R such that f
⋆
Ef⋆ ≁ f
⋆. Since V (f⋆Ef⋆)+
V (f⋆Ef
⋆) = V (f⋆)+V (f⋆), we can w.l.o.g restrict our attention to two cases:
(a) V (f⋆) > V (f⋆Ef⋆) , V (f⋆Ef
⋆) > V (f⋆) and (b) V (f
⋆
Ef⋆) > V (f
⋆) >
V (f⋆) > V (f⋆Ef
⋆).
In either case, consider VE and VEc the vNM utility functions representing
DE and DEc such that VE (f
⋆) = V (f ⋆), VEc (f
⋆) = 0, VE (f⋆) = V (f⋆Ef
⋆),
VEc (f⋆) = V (f
⋆
Ef⋆)−V (f
⋆). Note that it is possible to choose this normaliza-
tion for these vNM utility functions. Indeed, in case (a), we have f⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and
f⋆ ⊲Ec f⋆ and the normalization proposed is such that VE (f
⋆) > VE (f⋆) and
VEc (f
⋆) > VEc (f⋆), while in case (b), we have f
⋆ ⊲E f⋆ and f⋆ ⊲Ec f
⋆ and the
normalization proposed is such that VE (f
⋆) > VE (f⋆) and VEc (f
⋆) < VEc (f⋆).
Let f, g ∈ R and consider a first case where f⋆ DE f DE f⋆ and g is in between
f⋆ and f⋆ according to DEc . Then there exist a, b
c ∈ (0, 1) such that
f ≈E af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆;
g≈Ec b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆.
If a ≥ bc, then by definition of R and since V (f⋆Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) = V (f ⋆) +
V (f⋆),
V (fEg) =V ((af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (b
cf ⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆))
= bcV (f ⋆) + (a− bc)V (f⋆Ef⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆)
= aV (f⋆) + (1− a)(V (f⋆) + V (f⋆)− V (f
⋆
Ef⋆)) + 0.b
c
+(1− bc)(V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
= aV (f⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + 0.bc + (1− bc)(V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
= aVE (f
⋆) + (1− a)VE (f⋆) + b
cVEc (f
⋆) + (1− bc)VEc (f⋆)
=VE (af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆) + VEc (b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆)
=VE (f) + VEc (g) .
If bc ≥ a, then by definition of R and since V (f⋆Ef⋆) + V (f⋆Ef
⋆) = V (f ⋆) +
V (f⋆),
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V (fEg) =V ((af
⋆ + (1− a)f⋆)E (b
cf ⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆))
= aV (f⋆) + (bc − a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + (1− bc)V (f⋆)
= aV (f⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + 0.bc + (1− bc)(V (f⋆)− V (f⋆Ef
⋆))
= aV (f⋆) + (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + 0.bc + (1− bc)(V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
= aVE (f
⋆) + (1− a)VE (f⋆) + b
cVEc (f
⋆) + (1− bc)VEc (f⋆)
=VE (f) + VEc (g) .
Consider now a second case, where f DE f
⋆ and g is in between f ⋆ and f⋆
according to DEc . Then there exist a, b
c ∈ (0, 1) such that
f⋆ ≈E af + (1− a)f⋆;
g≈Ec b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆.
Therefore by definition of R,
V (f⋆Eg) = V ((af + (1− a)f⋆)E g)
⇔V (f⋆E (b
cf⋆ + (1− bc)f⋆)) = aV (fEg) + (1− a)V (f⋆Eg)
⇔ bcV (f⋆) + (1− bc)V (f ⋆Ef⋆) = aV (fEg)
+(1− a) (bcV (f⋆Ef
⋆) + (1− bc)V (f⋆))
⇔V (fEg) =
bcV (f⋆) + (1− bc)V (f⋆Ef⋆)
a
−
(1− a) (bcV (f⋆Ef
⋆) + (1− bc)V (f⋆))
a
.
Using the fact that V (f⋆) = V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆), we get that
V (fEg) =
(1− a + abc)V (f ⋆)− (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + a(1− bc)V (f⋆Ef⋆)
a
.
We also have that
VE (f) =
VE (f
⋆)− (1− a)VE (f⋆)
a
;
VEc (g) = b
cVEc (f
⋆) + (1− bc)VEc (f⋆) .
Thus
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VE (f) +VEc (g)
=
VE (f
⋆)− (1− a)VE (f⋆) + a (b
cVEc (f
⋆) + (1− bc)VEc (f⋆))
a
=
V (f ⋆)− (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + a(1− bc) (V (f ⋆Ef⋆)− V (f
⋆))
a
=
(1− a + abc)V (f ⋆)− (1− a)V (f⋆Ef
⋆) + a(1− bc)V (f⋆Ef⋆)
a
,
and therefore V (fEg) = VE (f) + VEc (g).
In the other cases the proof can be adapted to show that V (fEg) = VE (f) +
VEc (g).
Finally, remark that property 2 is satisfied with kE = 0.
B2. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose % is uncertainty neutral on E with respect to R. Let us prove that
for all f, g ∈ R, V (fEg) + V (gEf) = V (f) + V (g) and thus that k
E = 0.
Let f, g ∈ R and assume first that f ∼ g.
If f DE g and f DEc g, then f % fEg, gEf % g and thus f ∼ fEg ∼ gEf ∼ g.
Therefore, V (fEg) + V (gEf) = V (f) + V (g).
If f DE g and f ⊳Ec g, then fEg % f ∼ g % gEf . If f ∼ fEg ∼ gEf ∼ g
then V (fEg) + V (gEf) = V (f) + V (g). However, w.l.o.g let us suppose that
fEg ≻ f . Since % is not degenerate on R, there exists h ∈ R such that h ≁ f .
Suppose h ≻ f and w.l.o.g, suppose that fEg ≻ h ≻ f ∼ g % gEf . Then
1
2
f +
1
2
h ∼ afEg + (1− a)f ∼ bgEf + (1− b)h,
where a = 1
2
V (h)−V (f)
V (fEg)−V (f)
and b = 1
2
V (h)−V (f)
V (h)−V (gEf)
. Since
1
2
f +
1
2
h ∼ fE (ag + (1− a)f) ∼ (bg + (1− b)h)E (bf + (1− b)h) ,
and % is uncertainty neutral on E,
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(
b
a + b
f +
a
a + b
(bg + (1− b)h)
)
E(
b
a + b
(ag + (1− a)f) +
a
a + b
(bf + (1− b)h)
)
∼ fE (ag + (1− a)f)
∼
1
2
f +
1
2
h.
Note that
(
b
a + b
f +
a
a + b
(bg + (1− b)h)
)
E(
b
a + b
(ag + (1− a)f) +
a
a + b
(bf + (1− b)h)
)
∼
(1 + a)b
a + b
(
1
1 + a
f +
a
1 + a
g
)
+
a(1− b)
a + b
h
∼
(1 + a)b
a + b
f +
a(1− b)
a + b
h.
Thus we have that
(1 + a)b
a + b
V (f) +
a(1− b)
a + b
V (h) =
1
2
V (f) +
1
2
V (h),
which is equivalent to
1
4
(
2V (fEg) + V (h)− 3V (f)
V (fEg)− V (f)
)(
V (h)− V (f)
V (h)− V (gEf)
)
V (f)
+
1
4
(
V (h)− V (f)
V (fEg)− V (f)
)(
V (h) + V (f)− 2V (gEf)
V (h)− V (gEf)
)
V (h)
=
1
4
(
V (h)− V (f)
V (fEg)− V (f)
+
V (h)− V (f)
V (h)− V (gEf)
)
(V (f) + V (h)) ,
equivalent to
(2V (fEg) + V (h)− 3V (f))V (f) + (V (h) + V (f)− 2V (gEf))V (h)
= (V (h)− V (gEf) + V (fEg)− V (f)) (V (f) + V (h)) ,
and finally to
(2V (f)− V (fEg)− V (gEf)) (V (h)− V (f)) = 0.
Since V (h) > V (f), we must have V (fEg)+V (gEf) = 2V (f) = V (f)+V (g).
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The proof is similar for the other cases (f ≻ h or f ⊳E g and f DEc g).
Suppose now that f ≻ g and consider a first case where f DE g and f DEc g
and thus f % fEg, gEf % g. First note that if f ∼ fEg, then gEf ∼ g and
thus V (fEg) + V (gEf) = V (f) + V (g).
If f ≻ fEg % gEf , then fEg ∼ (af + (1− a)g)E f where a =
V (fEg)−V (gEf)
V (f)−V (gEf)
.
Since % is uncertainty neutral on E,
(
1− a
2− a
f + (1−
1− a
2− a
) (af + (1− a)g)
)
E
(
1− a
2− a
g + (1−
1− a
2− a
)f
)
∼ fEg.
Note that
(
1− a
2− a
f + (1−
1− a
2− a
) (af + (1− a)g)
)
E
(
1− a
2− a
g + (1−
1− a
2− a
)f
)
=
1
2− a
f +
1− a
2− a
g.
We also have fEg ∼ bf +(1− b)g where b =
V (fEg)−V (g)
V (f)−V (g)
. Since f ≻ g, b = 1
2−a
;
this is equivalent to
2−
V (fEg)− V (gEf)
V (f)− V (gEf)
=
V (f)− V (g)
V (fEg)− V (g)
⇔ (2V (f)− V (gEf)− V (fEg))(V (fEg)− V (g))
= (V (f)− V (gEf)) (V (f)− V (g))
⇔−V (f)V (g) + 2V (f)V (fEg)− V (gEf)V (fEg) + V (gEf)V (f)
−V (fEg)V (fEg) + V (fEg)V (g)− V (f)V (f) = 0
⇔ (V (f)− V (fEg))(−V (f)− V (g) + V (gEf) + V (fEg)) = 0.
Since f ≻ fEg, therefore V (fEg)+V (gEf) = V (f)+V (g). The proof is similar
in the case where f ≻ gEf % fEg.
Conversely, suppose that kE = 0. Consider the utility functions V E, V E, V Ec
and V Ec . As shown in the proof of Proposition 1 these functions are linear
with respect to mixture on R. Note that kE = 0 implies that for all f, g ∈ R,
V E(f) + V Ec(g) = V E(f) + V Ec(g).
Let consider f, g, h, ℓ ∈ R such that fEg ∼ hEℓ and α ∈ (0, 1).
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V ((αf + (1− α)h)E (αg + (1− α)ℓ))
=V E(αf + (1− α)h) + V Ec(αg + (1− α)ℓ)
=α
(
V E(f
)
+ V Ec(g)) + (1− α)
(
V E(h
)
+ V Ec(ℓ))
=αV (fEg) + (1− α)V (hEℓ),
and thus (αf + (1− α)h)E (αg + (1− α)ℓ) ∼ fEg.
B3. Proof of Proposition 3
Observe first that, since %i and %j satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 1,
they have a representation as in that proposition. Hence, for f and g such
that Vi(f) > Vi(g), it is the case that k
E
i =
Vi(fEg)−Vi(g)
Vi(f)−Vi(g)
− Vi(f)−Vi(gEf)
Vi(f)−Vi(g)
, and
similarly for kEj .
Let f, g ∈ Ri, f
′, g′ ∈ Rj such that f ≻i g and f
′ ≻j g
′.
Consider first the combination of case (i) and (i’), i.e., fEg ∼i αf + (1− α)g
and f ′Eg
′ ∼j αf
′ + (1− α)g′, on the one hand and gEf ∼i βg + (1− β)f and
g′Ef
′ ∼j βg
′ + (1− β)f ′ on the other hand.
Then, using the representation, (i) implies that
α =
Vi(fEg)− Vi(g)
Vi(f)− Vi(g)
=
Vj(f
′
Eg
′)− Vj(g
′)
Vj(f ′)− Vj(g′)
,
while (i’) implies that
β =
Vi(gEf)− Vi(f)
Vi(g)− Vi(f)
=
Vj(g
′
Ef
′)− Vj(f
′)
Vj(g′)− Vj(f ′)
.
Hence, kEi = α− β = k
E
j .
Consider next case (i) and (ii’). Then, Vi(gEf)−Vi(f)
Vi(g)−Vi(f)
=
Vj(g
′
E
f ′)−Vj(f
′)
Vj(g′)−Vj(f ′)
= 1
β
and
hence kEi = α−
1
β
= kEj .
The other cases can be dealt with in a similar fashion.
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Appendix C
C1. Proof of Theorem 1
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of our main result. We decompose
the proof into 4 lemmas. Although not always explicitly stated in the lemma,
all the assumptions of Theorem 1 are made throughout this Appendix. The
following Lemma is adapted from Weymark (1993, Lemma 1):
Lemma 1 Let (Vi)i∈N be a collection of Ri-affine representation of %i for
all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then,
(V1, · · · , Vn) are affinely independent on ∩i∈NRi.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that (V1, · · · , Vn) are affinely dependent
on ∩i∈NRi, that is, there exists (λ1, · · · , λn) ∈ R
n and µ ∈ R such that∑n
i=1 λiVi(f) + µ = 0 for all f ∈ ∩i∈NRi with at least one λj 6= 0. Without
loss of generality, assume that λ1 = −1. We then have:
V1(f) =
∑
i6=1
λiVi(f) + µ, ∀f ∈ ∩i∈NRi. (2)
Let f and g in ∩i∈NRi be such that f ∼i g for all i 6= 1 and f ≻1 g (such acts
exist, since {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the independent prospects property on ∩iRi). But
equation (2) implies that V1(f) = V1(g), a contradiction.
Lemma 2 There exist f¯ , f ∈ ∩i∈NRi such that f¯ ≻i f for all i ∈ N
′.
Proof. For all i ∈ N ′, let f¯i, f i ∈ ∩i∈NRi be such that f¯i ≻i f i and f¯i ∼j f i
for all j 6= i (such acts exist since {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the independent prospects
property). Consider αj ∈ ]0, 1[ for j = 2, .., n and define recursively f¯
j, f j by
• f¯ 2 = α2f¯1 + (1− α2)f¯2, f
2 = α2f1 + (1− α2)f 2
• for j = 3, .., n, f¯ j = αj f¯
j−1 + (1− αj)f¯j, f
j = αjf
j−1 + (1− αj)f j.
Since ∩i∈NRi is a mixture space, f¯
n, fn ∈ ∩i∈NRi and it can be checked that
f¯n ≻i f
n for all i ∈ N ′.
Lemma 3 Let E ∈ Σ. Let (Vi)i∈N be a collection of Ri-affine representation
of %i for all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
There exist unique weights (λ1, · · · , λn) ∈ R
n
+ \ {0}, µ ∈ R, such that
∀f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E), V0(f) =
∑
i∈N ′
λiVi(f) + µ.
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Proof. Define F : B(∩i∈NRi, E) → R
n+1 by F (f) = (V0(f), V1(f), · · · , Vn(f))
and let Kf = co{f,∩i∈NRi} for all f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E). Clearly, for all f ∈
B(∩i∈NRi, E), Kf is a convex set, ∩i∈NRi ⊆ Kf , and
⋃
f∈B(∩i∈NRi,E) Kf =
B(∩i∈NRi, E).
We first prove that F (Kf ) is convex for all f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E). Let f be fixed,
and consider g1, g2 ∈ Kf , with g1 6= g2. Let γ = tF (g1) + (1 − t)F (g2), with
t ∈ (0, 1). By definition, there exist α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1], and h1, h2 ∈ ∩i∈N ′Ri such
that g1 = α1f +(1−α1)h1 and g2 = α2f +(1−α2)h2. Let g3 = tg1 +(1− t)g2.
Let h3 =
t(1−α1)
t(1−α1)+(1−t)(1−α2)
h1 +
(1−t)(1−α2)
t(1−α1)+(1−t)(1−α2)
h2
12 . It is easy to see that
g3 = [tα1 + (1 − t)α2]f + [1 − (tα1 + (1 − t)α2)]h3. Note that ∩i∈NRi is a
mixture set and thus h3 ∈ Kf .
We hence have, by affinity of the Vi
Vi(g3) = [tα1 + (1− t)α2]Vi(f) + [1− (tα1 + (1− t)α2)]Vi(h3)
= [tα1 + (1− t)α2]Vi(f) +
[1− (tα1 + (1− t)α2)]
[
t(1− α1)
t(1− α1) + (1− t)(1− α2)
Vi(h1)
+
(1− t)(1− α2)
t(1− α1) + (1− t)(1− α2)
Vi(h2)
]
= t[α1Vi(f) + (1− α1)Vi(h1)] + (1− t)[α2Vi(f) + (1− α2)Vi(h2)]
= tVi(α1f + (1− α1)h1) + (1− t)Vi(α2f + (1− α2)h2)
= tVi(g1) + (1− t)Vi(g2).
Hence F (g3) = γ, which proves that F (Kf ) is convex.
By Proposition 2 in De Meyer and Mongin (1995), the convexity of F (Kf ),
axiom 2 and the existence of two acts f, g such that f ≻i g for all i ∈ N
′
imply that there exist non-negative numbers λ1(f), · · · , λn(f), not all equal
to zero, and a real number µ(f) such that, for all g ∈ Kf ,
V0(g) =
n∑
i=1
λi(f)Vi(g) + µ(f).
Now, consider f1 and f2 in B(∩i∈NRi). Since ∩i∈NRi ⊆ Kf1 ∩Kf2 , for all act
h ∈ ∩i∈N ′Ri, we have:

V0(h) =
∑n
i=1 λi(f1)Vi(h) + µ(f1)
V0(h) =
∑n
i=1 λi(f2)Vi(h) + µ(f2).
12 Since g1 6= g2, α1 6= α2, and therefore t(1− α1) + (1− t)(1− α2) 6= 0.
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This implies that for all h ∈ ∩i∈N ′Ri,
∑n
i=1[λi(f1) − λi(f2)]ui(h) + [µ(f1) −
µ(f2)] = 0. Since by lemma 1, the Vi are affinely independent on ∩i∈N ′Ri,
λi(f1) = λi(f2) i ∈ N
′ and µ(f1) = µ(f2). Therefore, there exist n non-
negative numbers, not all equal to zero, (λ1, · · · , λn) and a number µ, such
that for all f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E),
V0(f) =
n∑
i=1
λiVi(f) + µ.
Finally, it remains to show that the weights (λ1, · · · , λn) and µ are unique.
Since the {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the independent prospects property, there exist for
all i ∈ N ′ h⋆i , hi⋆ in ∩i∈NRi such that


h⋆i ≻i hi⋆
h⋆i ∼j hi⋆, ∀j ∈ N
′ \ {i}.
We have V0(h
⋆
i )−V0(hi⋆) = λi (Vi(h
⋆
i )− Vi(hi⋆)) and thus λi is unique. This is
true for all i ∈ N ′. But since (λ1, · · · , λn) are unique, so is µ.
Lemma 4 Let (Vi)i∈N be a collection of Ri-affine representation of %i for
all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Let the
weights (λ1, · · · , λn) ∈ R
n
+ \ {0}, µ ∈ R, be such that
∀f ∈ B(∩i∈NRi, E), V0(f) =
∑
i∈N ′
λiVi(f) + µ.
If there exist i, j ∈ N ′ such that λi, λj > 0, then these two agents have uncer-
tainty neutral preferences on E.
Proof. First, remark that for any i ∈ N ′ such that λi > 0, k
E
i = k
E
0 . Indeed,
since the {%i}i∈N ′ satisfy the independent prospects property, there exist h
⋆,
h⋆ in ∩i∈N ′Ri such that


h⋆ ≻i h⋆
h⋆ ∼j h⋆, ∀j ∈ N
′ \ {i}.
We have that
V0(h
⋆
Eh⋆) + V0(h⋆Eh
⋆)− (V0(h
⋆) + V0(h⋆)) = k
E
0 (V0(h
⋆)− V0(h⋆))
= kE0 λi(Vi(h
⋆)− Vi(h⋆)),
but also
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V0(h
⋆
Eh⋆) + V0(h⋆Eh
⋆)− (V0(h
⋆) + V0(h⋆))
= λi(Vi(h
⋆
Eh⋆) + Vi(h⋆Eh
⋆)− (Vi(h
⋆) + Vi(h⋆)))
= kEi λi(Vi(h
⋆)− Vi(h⋆)),
and thus kE0 = k
E
i .
Suppose now that there exist i, j ∈ N ′ such that λi, λj > 0. Consider h
⋆
i ,
hi⋆, h
⋆
j , hj⋆ in ∩i∈N ′Ri such that


h⋆i ≻i hi⋆
h⋆i ∼h hi⋆, ∀h ∈ N
′ \ {i},
and 

h⋆j ≻j hj⋆
h⋆j ∼h hj⋆, ∀h ∈ N
′ \ {j}.
Note that for α =
V0(h⋆j )−V0(hj⋆)
V0(h⋆i )−V0(hi⋆)+V0(h
⋆
j
)−V0(hj⋆)
∈ [0, 1], we have
V0 (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆) = V0
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
.
We also have that
Vi (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆) > Vi
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
and
Vj (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆) < Vj
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
.
Thus,
V0
(
(αh⋆i + (1− α)hj⋆)E
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
))
+ V0
((
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
E
(αh⋆i + (1− α)hj⋆)
)
−
(
V0(αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆) + V0(αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j)
)
= 0,
but it must also be the case that
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V0
(
(αh⋆i + (1− α)hj⋆)E
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
))
+V0
((
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
E
(αh⋆i + (1− α)hj⋆)
)
(
V0(αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆) + V0(αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j)
)
=λik
E
i
[
Vi (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)− Vi
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)]
+λjk
E
j
[
Vj
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
− Vj (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)
]
= kE0
[
λi
[
Vi(αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)− Vi(αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j)
]
+λj
[
Vj(αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j)− Vj(αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)
]]
.
Since
[λi
[
Vi (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)− Vi
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)]
+ λj
[
Vj
(
αhi⋆ + (1− α)h
⋆
j
)
− Vj (αh
⋆
i + (1− α)hj⋆)
]
] > 0,
we must have kE0 = k
E
i = k
E
j = 0.
C2. Proof of Proposition 4
Follows from lemma 1 to 3.
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